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MANDATORY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
By CEAREs H. WOODS
Some recent decisions, to be commented on in detail later, have lent a
measure of confirmation to conclusions of the Staff of the Stanford Law
Review set forth in the December, 1950 issue of that periodical:
"Any extension of the concept of collective bargaining means that labor
will have a stronger voice in managerial decisions." 1
"In union eyes, collective bargaining is not primarily an instrument of
industrial peace. It is a device by which the worker can gain at least partial
control of functions heretofore monopolized by management." 2
"1... the um6ns are steadily usurping managerial functions." -3
Whether these strongly expressed views are or are not sound, this article
will not undertake to discuss." Undoubtedly the cases above referred to
came- as a shock to many in management and caused them to fear that
collective bargaining as a technique could from now on take only one direc-
tion, and that by way of extension into the realm which has gone by the
name of "managerial prerogative." To many, the entire bargaining process
came to be viewed with suspicion and distrust; and feeling arose that laws
must be passed to curb the tendency. Others placed reliance on protective
clauses in the agreement itself. Still others undertook with success to
develop schemes of harmony and cooperation.
The purpose of this article is a very mundane one, close to earth. It is
to examine the important cases which have been decided by the National
Labor Relations Board on the scope, the extent and the intent of collective
bargaining; to see, by example, how far the unions have actually sought to
transcend and invade the traditional province of management; to observe
the attitude of the courts as they have dealt with these Board decisions;
and to permit at least some tentative conclusions as to future trends from
past instances. That these conclusions, in the nature of things, can be no
more than tentative must be recognized since the field is an ever-changing
one. But the actual facts, based on the cases themselves, would legitimately
seem to furnish ground for belief that the fears and suspicions of manage-
ment are either exaggerated or unwarranted. The old days, when manage-
ment was supreme, could act in all matters unilaterally, held no respon-
1 Comment, 3 STAN. L. REv. 88, 96 (1950).
21d. at 97.
8 Ibid.
4 A voluminous literature has accumulated on this subject. Especially noteworthy exam-
ples are NEIL W CHAMBERLIN, TM UNI oN CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMIENT CONTROL, DouGLAs
V. BROWN, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT (1948); HILL & Hooxr,
MANAGE&ENT AT THE BARGAINING TABLE (1945).
sibility except to itself are gone. The days when employees were content
to talk and bargain over the traditional wages and hours likewise are no
more. But the exact line of the law where right and wrong touch each other
must be left to await the accumulation of a body of decided cases greater,
.and perhaps different, than we now have.
A. A Bit of Background
Since 1935 the basic concepts of federal policy with respect to labor-
management relations have centered in the right of employees to organize
and to bargain collectively.
"To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation
of the employer and the representative of the employeeg to meet at rea-
sonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party,
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession." (Emphasis added.)
The duty of the employer to bargain is spelled out in Section 8(a) 5 and
of the labor organization in Section 8(b)3:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the pro-
visions of 9 (a)."
Likewise,
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer.., subject to the
provisions of 9(a)."
Section 9 (a) provides in part:
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining ... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment."5
(Emphasis added.)
To carry out its policies in respect to collective bargaining, Congress
created an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board
(hereinafter referred to as the Board) and vested it with great power and
discretion.
The idea of collective bargaining was not invented by Congress in 193 5.
It can be found in operation in the 1820's. From there its course can be
traced down through the years to the Civil War, the Spanish War, and to
549 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1949); 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
167 (1949).
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the end of the century. Then we tAke up the skein with the findings of the
United States Strike Commission in 1895,8 the passage of the Erdman Act
in 1,898,1 the Newlands Act in 1913,8 the Clayton Act in 1914.1
In 190210 and again in 1915,11 federal commissions made exhaustive
studies leading to the conclusion that disputes between management and
men were a prolific source of industrial strife and unrest. During World
War I, President Wilson set up a War Labor Board, one of whose principles
was "the right of workers to organize in trade unions and to bargain collec-
tively."' 2 Following the War came the Transportation Act of 1920,1 the
Railway Labor Act of 1926.1' This act, as amended in 1934,15 had as one
of its cardinal principles "to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement
of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions."' 6
(Emphasis added.) Another was that "employees shall have the right to
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing."'1 7 Machinery was provided for adjustment of grievances, media-
tion and arbitration of disputes and, these failing, the appointment by the
President of an Emergency Board. From the time of the appointment of
the board and for thirty days after it made its report, no strike was to be
permitted.'
In 1930 the Supreme Court handed down an epoch-making decision.?
Note this brief excerpt from'the opinion:
"We entertain no doubt of the constitutional authority of Congress to
enact the prohibition."
The justice is here talking about the statute's prohibition of interference
6The commission appointed by President Cleveland following the Pullman strike.
7 Act of June 1, 1898, 30 STAT. 424 (1898).
8 Act of July 15, 1913, 38 STAT. 103 (1913). A Board of Mediation and Conciliation was
established to mediate or arbitrate disputes in the railroad field.
9Act of October 15, 1914, 38 STAT. 730 (1914); put to sleep by Duplex v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443 (1920) until resurrected by U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). See Twentieth
Century Fund, Trends in Collective Bargaining (1945); also Magruder, A Half Century of
Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 HARv. L. REv. 1071 (1837);
Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargai" Concept, 39 McH. L. Rnv. 1065 (1941).
10 H.R. Doc. No. 380, 57th CONG, 1st Sess. (1902).
11 Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report; SEN. Doc. No. 415, 64th CONG., 1st
Sess. 233, 234 (1915).
12NATIONAL WAR LABoR BoARD, PRNciPiEs AND Ruxis or PRocEDuRE (1919); TE=Lxa,
MANGEmENT FUNcTIoNs uNDwa CoLcTIvE BAROAaNING (1947), c. 3.
13 Act of Feb. 28, 1920, 41 STAT. 456, tit. 3 (1920).
14 Act of May 20, 1926, 44 STAT. 578 (1926).
15 Act of June 21, 1934, 48 STAT. 1185 (1934).
16Id., § 2(4).
17Id., § 2, fourth paragraph.
i8 Id., § 10.
29 Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bro. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
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and coercion in connection with the choice of collective bargaining repre-
sentatives:
"Congress may facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes which
threaten the service of the necessary agencies of interstate transportation.
... The legality of collective action on the part of employees in order to
safeguard their proper interests is not to be disputed. It has long been rec-
ognized that employees are entitled to organize for the purpose of securing
the redress of grievances and to promote agreements with employers re-
lating to rates of pay and conditions of work.... The Railway Labor Act
of 1926 does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the carrier
to select its employees or to discharge them. The statute is not aimed at
this right of the employers but at the interference with the right of em-
ployees to have representatives of their own choosing."' 20
This decision gave impetus and encouragement to those seeking a legal
foundation upon which to establish the practise and procedure of collective
bargaining for the whole of industry. The first manifestation of this purpose
came with the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act, with its
section 7(a) reading in part as follows: ".... that employees shall have the
right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing."' Following the failure of this Act to function and to with-
stand the test of constitutionality,' came the Wagner Act.m
B. The Problems
The purposes for which employers and labor organizations are com-
pelled to bargain in good faith are nowhere specifically defined other than
by the use of the terms "rates of pay," "wages," "hours of employment" or
"other conditions of employment." Nowhere are these terms given definite
content, either statutorily or otherwise. What is within and what without
cannot be ascertained from any one authoritative pronouncement, having
application at all times and on all occasions and under all circumstances.
Some questions on both sides of the line may be so clear as not to involve
any possibility of dispute. If the union is asking for an increase from 17
cents an hour to 25 cents, surely that involves "rates of pay" and "wages,"
and collective bargaining processes must be pursued.
On the other side of the line there may be subjects which are just as
clearly outside the pale of collective bargaining, which are solely the func-
2 0 1d. at 570.
21Act of June 16, 1933, 48 STAT. 195 (1933).
22Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 493 (1935).
23Act of July 15, 1935, 49 STAT. 449 (1935). The difference between the wording of the
Wagner Act and the Railway Labor Act in respect to the subjects of collective bargaining was
commented on in Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied
336 U.S. 960 (1948).
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tion and responsibility of management if private enterprise is to be pre-
served and the business is to succeed. The determination of financial poli-
cies, general accounting procedures, and prices of goods sold or services
rendered to consumers would seem to fall within this class. But union
leadership is not willing to go on record as categorically agreeing that any
subject within the domain of labor-management relationship shall be auto-
matically and definitely debarred from the scope of collective bargaining,
while at the same time asserting generally that "the functions and respon-
sibilities of management must be preserved if business and industry is to
be efficient, progressive and provide more good jobs."'
Mr. Charles E. Wilson, who was a member of the President's Commis-
sion of 1945, then president of General Motors and now Secretary of De-
fense, gave testimony on this point before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare in 1947 when amendment of the Wagner Act, which
led to the Taft-Hartley Act, was under consideration in the 80th Congress.
He pleaded for a concrete specification and enumeration of items to be ex-
cluded altogether. He said:
"Before the N.L.R.A. was passed, this issue does not seem to have been
very important. Unions generally confined their negotiations with em-
ployers to the narrow issue of wages, working hours and other specific
conditions of employment .... With the rise of industrial unions, under the
N.L.R.A., a new concept of collective bargaining began to appear. For
example, several years ago, the president of the C.I.O. proposed a plan for
the re-organization of American industry on the basis of 'industrial coun-
cils' to be established in each business, in each industry.
"In the Labor-Management Conference Committee we attempted
to reach an agreement with the representatives of the principal union fed-
erations as to the area in which management should make decisions on its
own responsibility, without consultation with the unions and not subject
to union veto. The union leaders were unwilling to make any agreement in
this matter. However, the sessions served one very useful purpose. They
brought out sharply and forcibly that there is a basic conflict on this matter
that cannot be resolved by collective bargaining. Furthermore it is an issue
which cannot be resolved within the present definitions in the N.L.R.A.
because nowhere within that act is the subject matter of collective bargain-
ing accurately delineated and the limits of the area of collective bargaining
defined. The reference in the act to wages, hours of employment, working
conditions and other conditions of employment can be stretched to com-
prehend almost anything that might indirectly and ultimately affect the
employment of the individual workman.... Accordingly I propose that
the N.L.R.A. be amended to specify that only rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment and the circumstances and conditions under which employees
24 Tna PREIENT'S NAT OAL LABOR-MwAGEmENT CON'ERENCE, Nov. 9-30, 1945, BuL.
No. 77, DEPT. or LABOR, p. 61.
25 See note 23, supra.
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actually perform work come within the area of collective bargaining re-
quired by the Act; that not only are employers not required to bargain
about any other matters, but that they will be protected legally in the event
unions attempt, through strike action, to compel them to do so." 2 6
That the position of the labor leaders was not merely arbitrary, dog-
matic and unreasonable is indicated by a brief quotation from their state-
ment at the Labor-Management Conference.
"The extensive exploratory discussions of the committee have brought
forth the wide variety of traditions, customs, and practises that have grown
out of relationships between unions and management in various industries
over a long period of time.
"Because of the complexities of these relationships, the labor members
of the committee think it unwise to specify and classify the functions and
responsibilities of management.... It would be extremely unwise to build
a fence around the rights and responsibilities of management on the one
hand and the unions on the other. The experience of many years shows
that with the growth of mutual understanding the responsibilities of one of
the parties today may well become the joint responsibility of both parties
tomorrow."27
Failing to get statutory relief,'8 many companies have been advised to
try the expedient of negotiating a clause in their collective bargaining
agreements defining the prerogatives of management. The legality of such
a clause has been upheld.2
To illustrate, in the agreement entered into on March 20, 1953, between
Rice-Stix, Inc. and Warehouse Union No. 688, article XI reads:
"The management of the company, including but not limited to the
establishment of rules not in conflict with this agreement, the direction of
the working forces, the right to hire, promote, suspend or discharge for
cause, the right to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work
or for other just reasons and to transfer employees from one department
26 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Hearings, 1947, pt. 1, pp. 437, 438.
To the same effect, Forney Johnston for the National Coal Association.
27 See note 24, supra.
28 This is not to say that the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act did not immediately and
importantly affect the collective bargaining process and proceduure. But it left the law where
it was so far as defining the scope of collective bargaining is concerned. Globe Cotton Mills v.
N.L.R.B., 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939). See Note, 61 HAgv. L. REv. 1225 (1948).
For the general effect of the amended law see Witte, The Effects of the Taft-Hartley Law
on Collective Bargaining, selected papers presented before the Graduate School of Business,
Columbia University, 1952. See also Ruth Weyand, The Scope of Collective Bargaining under
the Taft-Hartley Act, New York University 1st Annual Conference on Labor, 257 (1948). See
also by the same author, 45 CoL. L. REv. 556 (1945) and Note, 16 U. or Cm. L. REv. 568 (1949)
reviewing the Inland Steel case, supra note 23.That the Board thought there was no change in this particular, see 13 N.L.R.B. ANw.
RP.58 (1949).
2 D Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
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or duty to another, is vested exclusively in the company. This authority will
not be used for purposes of discrimination against any employee." 30
The Goodrich contract is a simple one:
"It is recognized that the operating of the various plants and the full
direction of the working forces is the function and responsibility of the
Company. The operation of the plants and the direction of the working
forces shall not conflict with the provisions of this agreement or of any
local supplementary agreement." 3 1
United States Steel:
"The Company retains the exclusive rights to manage the business and
to direct the working forces." 3 2
And General Motors:
"The right to hire; promote; discharge or discipline for cause; and to
maintain discipline and efficiency of employes, is the sole responsibility of
the Corporation except that Union members shall not be discriminated
against as such. In addition, the products to be manufactured, the location
of the plants, the schedules of production, the methods, processes and
means of manufacturing are solely and exclusively the responsibilities of
the Corporation."-'
The negotiation of these management contracts through the medium
of collective bargaining raises an interesting question as to how far manage-
ment itself may have gone toward establishing a precedent and thereby
fixing the right of employees to negotiate and the right and duty of the
Board to compel bargaining with respect to them.
Wholly outside the pale of this paper would be a discussion of the social,
economic and political aspects of the impact of collective bargaining on
managerial prerogatives.
C. The Lawyer's Proble-m
With no statutory guide or contract definition, where shall the lawyer
go for light when asked by an employer or a labor organization whether or
not they must bargain over a particular subject? The answer would seem
to be to the course of the common law of court decisions and to the adminis-
trative law of Board decrees, particularly the latter. One does not have to
wallow in the mire of "Administrative Expertise"" to recognize that the
305 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (4th ed. 1945) 1 59,941. Seealso the contracts on Lever Bros. and
Ford Motor Co., id. at 1 59,926 and 159,923.
31 Id. at 59,917; Bituminous Coal contract, id. at 1 59,914.
82 Id. at 1 59,908.
33 Id. at 1 59,905. Other specimen clauses are set forth in the appendix to TE=R, MA.rv
AGE MS T FuNcnONs umza Coixwnvn BARGAnaNG (1947). See Cox and Dunlop, Regulation
of Collective Bargaining by the N.L.R.B., 63 HAxv. L. Rav. 389, 405 (1950).
84 See 15 Foan. L. Rxv. 19 (1946).
Nov. 19541
Board was created by Congress to carry out its policies; that it has a con-
tinuity of knowledge and experience which makes its conclusions authori-
tative and valuable, to be followed with confidence if supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. 5 What follows, then,
consists of a reference to the more important Board opinions and the court
decisions which enforced or denied them, with first of all a brief reference
to N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Lauqhlin.3 G
To uphold the constitutionality of the Wagner Act in the light of the
then recent decisions was quite a job. To mollify some of the lawyers who
were living in yesterday, Justice Hughes thought it advisable to throw out
a sop or two. Among others, this:
"The Act does not compel agreements between employers and em-
ployees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not prevent
the employer from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring indi-
viduals on whatever terms the employer may by unilateral action deter-
mine. The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of
the employer to select its employees and to discharge them." 37 (Emphasis
added.)
Due process and the managerial prerogative were thus thought to have
been carefully preserved.
This concession caused no end of embarrassment, until it was repu-
diated in J. I. Case v. N.L.R.B.3 where it was said:
"It also is urged that such individual contracts may embody matters
that are not necessarily included within the statutory scope of collective
bargaining such as stock purchase, group insurance, hospitalization or
medical attention. We know of nothing to prevent the employee's, because
he is an employee, making any contract provided it is not inconsistent
with a collective agreement or does not amount to or result from or is not
part of an unfair labor practise. But in so doing the employer may not
incidentally exact or obtain any diminution of his own obligation or any
increase of those of employees in the matters covered by collective agree-
ment."39
35 Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1950). For an exhaustive discus-
sion of the cases and an interpretation of their meaning, see Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of
Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389 (1950).
The conclusion is reached by these authors that the Board and the courts should not have
"assumed" authority to determine what are and are not subjects of compulsory bargaining.
This conclusion is not challenged by Findling and Colby in Regulation of Collective Bargaining
by the National Labor Relations Board-Another View, 51 CoL. L. Rxv. 170 (1951).
The decision of the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. American Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395
(1952) goes pretty far in the direction of the Cox-Dunlop viewpoint.
36301 U.S. 1 (1937).
37Id. at 45.
38321 U.S. 332 (1944).
3 9 Id. at 339.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 6
MANDATORY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
From the Express Agency case4° note the following:
"Collective bargaining was not defined by the statute which provided
for it, but it generally has been considered to absorb and give statutory
approval to the philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor move-
ment in the United States." 41
D. Board and Court Decisions
The cases cited here are for purposes of illustration only. For a com-
plete and encyclopedic compilation, the reader must go elsewhere.42
On one point the cases are fairly clear and in substantial harmony:
There can be no mandatory duty to bargain, either on the part of manage-
ment or labor union, unless the particular proposal, by reasonable intend-
ment, can be fitted into one or the other of the statutory terms. Unless the
demand for collective bargaining shall be found to have some reasonable
relevance to "rates of pay" or to "wages" or to "hours of employment" or
finally to "other conditions of employment," then there is no violation of
the law if the parties refuse to bargain; and they cannot be held to be guilty
of an unfair labor practise. The quoted terms furnish, the touch stones, the
yardsticks, the exclusive measuring rods.'
Commenting briefly on two or three of the cited cases: Involved in the
Globe Cotton Mills case were 15% increase in wages, adjustment of dis-
putes and a demand to join with the union in seeking appropriate legisla-
tion. The court enforced the Board's order, except as to legislation.44 In the
Knoxville Publishing Company case, the court undertook to distinguish be-
40321 U.S. 342 (1944).
41Id. at 346.
4 CCH LAB. LAw Rr. (4th ed.); P-H Co aiT LABOR EQUIP.MENT AND AMERICAN
LABOR CASES (AL.C.); BUREAU or NATiONAL ArFAms (L.R.R.M.).
For the many and interesting decisions of the National War Labor Board, reference will
have to be made to the official reports of that Board. For an interesting and full discussion of
the War Labor Board's decisions on "management rights," see Fairweather and Shaw, 12 LAw
AND CONIrrss. PROB. 397, 407. See also Note, 36 MnhNe. L. REv. 109 (1951).
4 3 In the Matter of Hughes Tool Co. et al., 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), enforcement granted,
147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945); In the Matter of Montgomery Ward & Co. et al., 37 N.L.R.B. 100
(1941), enforcement granted, 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943); In the Matter of Aluminum Ore
Co. et al., 39 N.L.RB. 1286 (1942), enforcement granted, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942); In the
Matter of Rapid Roller Co. et al, 33 N.L.R.B. 557 (1941), enforcement granted, 126 F.2d 452
(7th Cir. 1942); In the Matter of Knoxville Publishing Co. et al., 12 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1939),
enforcement granted, 124 F.2d 875 (6th. Cir. 1942) ; In the Matter of Hoosier Veneer Co. et al.,
21 N.L.R.B. 907 (1940), enforcement granted, 120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1941); In the Matter of
the Boss Manufacturing Co. et al., 11 N.L.R.B. 432 (1939), enforcement granted, 118 F.2d 187
(7th Cir. 1941); In the Matter of Wilson & Co. et al., 19 N.L.R.B. 990 (1940); enforcement
granted, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940) ; In the Matter of Globe Cotton Mills et al., 6 N.L.R.B.
461 (1938), enforcement granted, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
44 6 N.L.R.B. 461 (1938), enforcement granted, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
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tween provisions of the proposed agreement with respect to wages, hours
and other conditions of employment which existed at the time the proceed-
ings before the Board were instituted and proposals respecting wages and
hours which arose later.5
In the Wilson case,46 the court used language which would seem to go a
little beyond the basic test. The court said:
"The Act obligates the employer to bargain in good faith both collec-
tively and exclusively with the chosen representatives of a majority of his
employees with respect to all matters which affecb his employees as a class,
including wages, hours of employment and working conditions. '47 (Em-
phasis added.)
To the same effect is N.L.R.B. v. Barrett Company.4
Collection of dues by a union from its members is not in its nature a
matter for collective bargaining, said the court in the Hughes Tool case.49
But notwithstanding this decision, the Board has held to the contrary" in
the belief that whatever might have been the rule under the Wagner Act,
it no longer held true under the Taft-Hartley Act.
In the Rapid Roller case,5 proposed changes in and the proper inter-
pretation of an existing contract were held to be proper subjects of collec-
tive bargaining.
Grievances
Although an individual employee has the right under section 9(a) of
the Wagner Act to present his grievances to his employer (and the same is
true under the Railway Labor Act),52 still the subject is a proper one for
collective bargaining and may be enforced, falling as it does under the head-
ing of conditions of work.53
4512 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1939), enforcement granted, 124 F.2d 875 (6th Cir. 1942).
4619 N.L.R.B. 990 (1940), enforcement granted, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940).
4 7 Id. at 763.
48 135 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1943).
49 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), enforcement granted, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
50 In the Matter of U.S. Gypsum et al., 94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1952); Reed & Prince Manu-
facturing Co. et al., 94 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951). State courts have also differed. Shine et al. v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 76 R.I. 71, 68 A.2d 379 (1949) ; Chabot et al. v. Pruden-
tial Ins. of America, 77 R.I. 396, 75 A.2d 317 (1950) ; contra: Sanford v. Boston Edison Co.,
319 Mass. 55, 64 N.E.2d 631 (1946).
51 In the Matter of Rapid Roller Co. et al., 33 N.L.R.B. 557 (1941), enforcement granted,
126 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1942).
52 E.J.&F. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1944), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
5 In the Matter of the Timken Roller Bearing Co. et al., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforce-
ment granted, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947); In the Matter of Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B.
981 (1944), enforcement granted, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945); In the Matter of the Arundel
Corp. et al., 59 N.L.R.B. 505 (1944); In'the Matter of U.S. Automatic Corp. et al., 56 N.L.R.B.
124 (1944) ; In the Matter of the North American Aviation, Inc. et al., 44 N.L.R.B. 604 (1942);
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Hours of Work and Rates of Pay
The number of hours during which the employee shall work and his
working schedule, including vacations, with or without pay, are within the
scope of mandatory bargaining and unilateral action is an unfair labor
practice. Among the matters included under this heading are seniority, pro-
motions, opportunities for advancement, vacations, leaves of absence, sick
leave, overtime, extra work, insurance and sick benefits, and "all other
matters of employee welfare which are or normally would be fruits of the
company's general personnel policies."-,
Whether the lease and rental of company-owned houses is a proper sub-
ject for mandatory bargaining would seem to depend largely on the extent
to which wages, hours of work, living conditions and other conditions. of
employment are involved.55
Safety and sanitary provisions,5 arbitration of disputes,57 issuing of
manuals of rules58 are all proper subjects for collective bargaining and will
be enforced as such.
The employer's obligation to produce data on demand of the union for
In the Matter of Cities Service Co. et al., 25 N.L.R.B. 36 (1940), enforcement granted, 122 F.2d
149 (2d Cir. 1941) ; In the Matter of Hoosier Veneer Co. et al., 21 N.L.R.B. 907 (1940), enforce-
-ment granted, 120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1941).
54 In the Matter of Carlisle & Jacquelin, 55 N.L.R.B. 678 (1944). Other illustrative cases
are: In the Matter of Hekman Furniture Co. et al., 101 N.L.R.B. 119 (1952), enforcement
granted, 207 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1953); In the Matter of Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc.,
70 NL.RB. 873 (1946); In the Matter of Libby-McNeill & Libby, 65 N.L.R.B. 873 (1946) ;
In the Matter of General Motors Corp., 59 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1944); In the Matter of South
Carolina Granite Co. et al., 58 N.L.R.B. 1148 (1944); In the Matter of U.S. Automatic Corp.,
47 N.L.R.B. 124 (1944) ; In the Matter of Aluminum Ore Co. et al., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1942),
enforcement granted, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942) ; In the Matter of Great Southern Trucking
Co. et al., 34 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1941), enforcement granted, 127 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1942); In the
Matter of Neuhoff Packing Co., Swift & Co. et al., 29 N.L.R.B. 746 (1941), enforcement granted,
127 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1942) ; In the Matter of V. 0. Milling Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 348 (1942) ; In
the Matter of Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), enforcement granted, 119 F.2d 131
(7th Cir. 1941); In the Matter of George P. Pilling & Son Co. et al., 16 N.L.R.B. 650 (1939),
enforcement granted, 119 F.2d 32 (3rd Cir. 1941); In the Matter of Inland Lime & Stone Co.
et al., 24 N.L.R.B. 758 (1940), enforcement granted, 119 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1941) ; In the Matter
of John J. Oughton et al., 20 N.L.R.B. 301 (1940), enforcement granted, 118 F.2d 486. (3rd Cir.
1940); In the Matter of Wilson & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940); In the Matter
of the Boss Mfg. Co. et al., 11 N.L.R.B. 432 (1939), enforcement granted, 118 F.2d 187 (7th
Cir. 1941).55 Bemis Bro. Bag Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 728 (1953), enforcement denied, 206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir.
1953). The case of Hart Cotton Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. 728 (1950), enforcement granted, 190 F.2d
964 (4th Cir. 1951) is distinguished.
. r0In the Matter of Knoxville Pub. Co., 12 NL.R.B. 1209 (1939), enforcement granted,
124 F.2d 875 (6th Cir. 1942).
57 In the Matter of Boss Mfg. Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 432 (1939), enforcement granted, 118 F.2d
187 (7th Cir. 1941).
58 In the Matter of Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforcement
granted, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
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the purposes of collective bargaining has been omitted from this discus-
sion.5
9
Insurance, Welfare Benefits, Pensions
As promised at the outset, this citation of Board and court cases may
well be concluded by a little more detailed reference to four cases, fairly
recent. These cases involved important questions, were hotly contested,
raised squarely the question of managerial prerogative and have excited
a good deal of comment.
The Allison case: I During five years of collective bargaining, the com-
pany has been granting so-called "merit increases" unilaterally. The con-
tract during these years set worth a scale of minimum wages, but did not
mention the subject of merit increases. The union requested to be furnished
a list of these employees and the amounts granted, in order that the union
might negotiate concerning them. This the company refused to do, on the
ground that merit increases were not a proper subject of collective bargain-
ing but were an exclusively managerial function. The Board found no
merit in this contention, and the court approved.
The Inland Steel case: " The Board sustained the Trial Examiner in
holding that the company was guilty of an u;nfair labor practise under sec-
tion 8(5) in failing and refusing to bargain with the union about the ap-
plication or modification of the terms of an old age retirement and pension
program. The program was originally established before the union was
recognized and had several times since been unilaterally amended. A quota-
tion from the Examiner's report should be of interest:
"It is conceivable that the demands of employees may sometimes fall
completely dehors the limits of employee interest. The Act does not seek
to encroach on those prerogatives of the employer which give him a free
hand to prosecute his business as he sees fit.... Our system of free enter-
prise must necessarily protect the employer in enjoying what is commonly
termed his 'management prerogatives.' True it is that over the years during
which the Act has been in existence, matters which formerly had been urged
as purely 'management prerogatives' were, by judicial and quasi-judicial
opinion, held to be matters which employees had the right, in the interest
of industrial stability, to seek to attain by peaceable negotiation."' 2
The Examiner also noticed, but rejected, the contention of the com-
59 See a comprehensive treatment of this problem in 35 MiNN. L. REv. 24 (1950).
6OIn the Matter of 3. H. Allison and Co. et al., 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946), enforcement
granted, 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948) ; cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).
61 In the Matter of Inland Steel Co. et al., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948), enforcement granted,
170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948). A petition for writ of certiorari was granted, 335 U.S. 910 (1948)
but later denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1948).
2 77 N.L.R.B. 1 at 26.
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pany based upon the Railway Labor Act; this point was stressed on appeal.
The court considered it in the following words:
"The company places great stress upon the bargaining language used
in the Railway Labor Act of 1926... on the theory that the instant act is
in pari materia. It points out that numerous retirement and pension plans
were put into effect by the railroads and that they were never subjected to
the process of collective bargaining.... In this connection, we think it is
pertinent to note that in the Railway Labor Act the bargaining language
was quite different from that of the instant legislation."63
The Cross case: 64 The Board held the company guilty of unfair labor
practise in refusing to recognize the union's right to negotiate with it con-
cerning the terms of a group health and accident insurance plan. In a no-
table opinion by C. J. Woodbury, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
upheld the Board and in the course of the opinion said:
"At least, without attempting to mark the outer boundaries of the mean-
ing of the word 'wages' as used in the Act, or attempting to enunciate a gen-
eralizing principle for the decision of future cases ... we think it can be
safely said that the word 'wages' in §9a of the Act embraces within its mean-
ing direct and immediate benefits flowing from the employment relation-
ship. And this is as far as we need go, for so construed the word covers a
group insurance program for the reason that such a program provides a
financial cushion in the event of illness or injury arising outside the scope
of employment at less cost than such a cushion could be obtained through
contracts of insurance negotiated individually." 65
The American National Insurance case: I The company was held guilty
by the Board because from the inception of the negotiations it took the
position that it would not conclude any contract with the union unless it
accepted the Respondent's so-called prerogative clause. This was held to
amount to intransigence. The Court of Appeals refused to concur, and in
this position it was sustained by the Supreme Court.7
E. Conclusion
Examination of Board and court decisions justifies certain observa-
tions.
The body of decided cases has not yet reached, and may never reach,
the point where broad generalizations with respect to the scope of collective
6 Id. at 54.
64
n the Matter of W. W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enforcement granted,
174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
6 174 F.2d 875, 878.
W In the Matter of the American National Insurance Co. et al., 89 N.L.R.B. 185 (1950),
enforcement denied, 187 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1951) ; aff'd, 343 U.S. 395 (1952), three judges
dissenting.
67343 U.S. 395 (1952). See discussion of this case in 52 CoL. L. REv. 1054 (1952).
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bargaining can be indulged in. As has been said, "collective bargaining is
easier to defend than define" and "the collective labor agreement can only
be described, not defined." 8
Both the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act have conferred broad
powers on the Board to determine from all the facts and circumstances of
a particular situation whether a particular proposal is within or without
the periphery of the terms "rates of pay," "wages," "hours of employment"
or "other conditions of employment."
The so-called management prerogatives have not been seriously im-
paired by anything that the Board or courts have done so far, if by manage-
ment prerogatives we would accept the illustrative items mentioned by the
management members of the President's National Labor-Management
Conference of 1945. Here we set forth, among others:
1. The determination of products to be manufactured, or services to be
rendered.
2. The determination of the layout and equipment to be used in the busi-
ness.
3. The determination of financial policies.
4. The determination of the management organization and the selection
of employees for promotion to supervisory positions.
5. The determination of job content and safety, health and property protec-
tion measures, where legal responsibility of the employer is involved.69
Labor leaders, on the whole, have not evinced any great desire to take
over a share in the duties and responsibilities of management, except as
they bear fairly directly on the status, physical or spiritual, of the working
man -recognizing that to share in management is to become a part of
management, and thus weakening their relationship and influence of their
members.
Aid finally, under the latest ruling of the Supreme Court as set forth
in the American Insurance case7 the insistence upon a managerial preroga-
tive clause as a counter proposal to the union's demand for unlimited arbi-
tration is not per se an unfair labor practise under the Act.
F. Another Look at the Lazvyer's Problem
The lawyer's problem, as viewed under subhead C. was conceived of as
requiring him to get such light from precedent as he could and advising his
68 Burstein, 3 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 902 (1951).
69 See note 22 supra. See also Feldman, The Right to Manage, 1 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 287;
Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management Prerogatives, a review of the Inland Steel
case, supra note 23, 16 U. oF Car. L. REv. 568 (1949) ; Proper Subjects for Collective Bargain-
ing: Ad Hoc v. Predictive Definition, 58 YALE L.J. 803 (1949).
7 0 American National Life Insurance Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra note 66.
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client accordingly. But must the ultimate soundness of that advice be left
to the later determination of a strike, or await the decision of the Board
after the event? Was there no way of hastening the decision and avoiding
the cost of error? Yes, said the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in the case of Akron, Canton and Youngstown Railroad v.
C. R. Barnes.71 There was a way, and that by invoking the procedures of
the Declaratory Judgment Act 72
The circumstances were these. The defendant railroad unions submitted
certain written proposals to the railroads in the course of negotiation of a
new union contract. These included establishment of an insurance and
welfare plan and free transportation for the affected employees and their
families. The railroads took the position that these two subjects did not
affect "rates of pay, rules and working conditions" as defined in the Rail-
way Labor Act and refused to bargain in reference thereto. The unions, on
the other hand, refused to bargain on any other proposals unless these two
were included. And there the parties stood.
The various procedural steps prescribed by the Railway Labor Act were
followed, leading to a strike vote and a decision by an Emergency Board
appointed by the President. The Court quotes the Emergency Board as
saying "that the questions as to whether the demands of the labor organi-
zations for a health and welfare plan and for free transportation come
within the language of the Railway Labor Act are questions which the
Board does not feel it should attempt to answer. They are questions involv-
ing statutory construction and for the courts to determine."
Under these circumstances, the Court held there was a justiciable con-
troversy, and a petition for a declaratory judgment would lie.
The case in which this decision was reached is still pending. The deci-
sion of the District Court dismissing the petition was reversed, but only
by a majority. A strongly-worded dissenting opinion sharply challenged
the majority action. The railroads are reported to have given in on one of
the two points in controversy, to have bargained, and to have settled.73
So for the present the decision cannot be viewed as fixing the law with
positive certainty, but only as pointing a way and holding out a promise.
7 1 Not yet officially reported, 26 LABoR CAsEs 1 68,618, 7th Cir., August 10, 1954.
72 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
7 3 LABOR LAW REPORTS, Weekly Summary No. 317, August 26, 1954.
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